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Abstract. Foreign direct investment (FDI) by entities controlled by foreign governments (especially 
state-owned enterprises) is a new global phenomenon that is most o!en linked to the rise of emerging 
markets such as China and Russia. Host governments have struggled to properly react to this type of 
investment activity especially in key strategic sectors and critical in"astructure that ultimately raise 
questions of national security. Academic research on sovereign investment as a factor contributing to 
the new global protectionist trend is very limited, and predominantly focused on sovereign investors 
"om China. #is study explores the speci$cs of Russian sovereign investment in the former Soviet 
Bloc countries, now members of the European Union, especially in strategic sectors such as energy. 
We use the case of Bulgaria’s nuclear energy sector and the involvement of Russia’s state-owned 
company Rosatom in the halted Belene nuclear power plant project to analyze the dynamics of policy 
and politics, political-economic ideologies and historical legacies in the formation of national stances 
towards Russia as a sovereign investor. Our research contributes to the emerging literature on FDI 
protectionism and sovereign investment by emphasizing the signi$cance of political-ideological divides 
and the heritage of the past as determinants of sovereign investment protectionism.
Key words: foreign direct investment policy; state-controlled entities; national security; nuclear 
energy, post-communist countries.
1. Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, foreign direct investment (FDI) established itself as a 
principal engine of national and global economic growth. !e industrialized countries 
took major steps to encourage FDI in previously highly restricted sectors such as 
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telecommunications, banking and energy. In the former Soviet Bloc countries, liberalized 
investment regimes and economic openness in general became the key instruments of 
the post-communist transition toward democracy and a market economy. In recent 
years, however, the global FDI liberalization trend has slowed down and even reversed 
to a new FDI protectionism. In fact, as Karl Sauvant reveals, the share of national FDI 
policy changes worldwide that made the investment climate less welcoming rose from 
only 6% in 2001-2002 to 32% in 2009-2010 (Sauvant, 2012, p. 2). !e literature on 
FDI has outlined various determinants of the rising protectionist trend ( Jackson, 
2010; GAO, 2008), the primary ones being national security concerns especially in 
sensitive strategic sectors and especially when sovereign investors are involved (Bath, 
2012).
FDI by entities a"liated and/or controlled by foreign governments – such as 
sovereign wealth funds (SWF) or state-owned enterprises (SOEs) – is an emerging 
global phenomenon that is most o#en linked to the rise of emerging markets such as 
China and Russia. !e global expansion of their national champions has led to heated 
political debates within many developed western countries. !eir governments have 
struggled to properly react to this type of investment activity ( Jost, 2012; Sauvant et al., 
2012; Golding, 2014), especially in key strategic sectors and critical infrastructure that 
ultimately raise questions of national security.
National security and strategic sectors are a widely acknowledged restraint for 
FDI policy openness in both academic work and the international policy community 
(Marchick & Slaughter, 2008; Kang, 1997; Graham, 1991; Hanley et al., 2002, OECD, 
2007b; UNCTAD, 2009). !ere is very limited academic research, however, on the 
new global sovereign investment trend (Sauvant et al., 2012; Feldman, 2012; Low, 
2012; Globerman, 2015). !is research is further predominantly focused on sovereign 
investment from China (Alon & Cherp, 2012; Bath, 2012; Meunier et al., 2012; 
Golding, 2014; Brennan, 2015) and much less on sovereign investments and emerging-
market multinationals from Russia (Zubkovskaya & Michailova, 2014).
!e general question that motivates this study is: What are the speci$c determinants 
of FDI protectionist policies against sovereign investments from Russia in the former 
Soviet Bloc countries – now members of the European Union (EU)? Are there shadows 
of the communist past, and if so, how is the communist heritage manifested in FDI 
policy and politics? 
Given the relative newness of the phenomenon, our study has an exploratory 
character and employs the case study methodology. We trace the involvement of 
Russia’s state-owned company Rosatom in Bulgaria’s nuclear energy sector and the 
halted Belene Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) project to reveal the dynamics of public 
discourse, policy and politics in sensitive sectors for national security when Russian 
state-controlled entities are involved.
Creating an FDI policy environment that is based on national strategic priorities 
and the national interest in general has been a complex process worldwide (Gupta, 
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2006) because of the variety and number of stakeholders involved and their individual 
stances on the level of openness of the country to foreign investors and the FDI country 
of origin. !e FDI policy framework that has emerged across di+erent Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries and the $nal outcome of the FDI legislation are 
thus a speci$c result of complex political processes involving international regimes 
(EU accession and membership requirements) as well as sectoral interests, coalition 
partners, inter-bureaucratic politics and last but not least – ideological orientations and 
historical & geopolitical legacies.
Our research contributes to the emerging literature on FDI protectionism and 
sovereign investments in two ways. First, it sheds an important light on complex 
situations involving Russian sovereign investments where national interests of the 
host country are internally contested along political-ideological divides and not clearly 
articulated. Second and relatedly, our research emphasizes the signi$cance of the 
geopolitical heritage of the past as a determinant of sovereign investment protectionism. 
!e study provides rich evidence about the historical embeddedness and the internally 
contested character of the national interest along the lines of le#ist-rightist ideological 
divides and Pro-West versus Pro-Russian orientations among political elites and the 
society at large.
In the next section we introduce key arguments from the literature on FDI 
protectionism and sovereign investment as a factor for FDI restrictions. We then 
proceed by outlining Bulgaria’s foreign direct investment policies and national security 
strategies, as well as the legacy of its economic relations with Russia in the energy 
sector. Subsequently, we provide a detailed analysis of Bulgaria’s search for strategic 
foreign investors in the nuclear energy sector, with a focus on the Belene NPP Project. 
We conclude with a discussion about the broader implications of the halted project for 
the literature on FDI protectionism and sovereign investment.
2. Literature Review and !eoretical Framework: Determinants  
of the Rising FDI Protectionism
!e literature on FDI has identi$ed at least four key and o#en intertwined determinants 
of the rising protectionist trend: (a) national security concerns, especially with regard 
to strategic sectors and critical infrastructure; (b) economic nationalism; (c) sovereign 
investment; and (d) public pressures. !us Marchick & Slaughter (2008) suggest that 
most of the recent FDI protectionist measures on a global scale have been justi$ed on 
the basis of protecting national security or safeguarding “strategic” industries. A relevant 
example would be Germany’s 2009 FDI law changes that strengthened the review and 
screening mechanisms to further protect the national security and public order ( Jost, 
2012). In addition to national security considerations and sensitive strategic sectors, 
pressures to restrict FDI in<ows come from economic nationalism and increased 
government a=ention to national developmental objectives with a focus only on those 
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FDI that are in line with the developmental goals of the country. !e rise of state-
controlled entities in the global market is another important determinant of the rising 
protectionist trend. Pressures from civil society and negative public opinion can also 
result in more restrictive FDI policies.
2.1. National Development Strategies and Economic Nationalism
!e existing consensus that all FDI are equally bene$cial to host countries is falling apart 
among both policy makers and academic scholars. Many governments increasingly 
consider some FDI as less bene$cial than others, and focus their FDI a=raction policies 
only on investments that make a maximum contribution to economic, social, and 
environmental development (Sauvant, 2012). !e need to make FDI more bene$cial 
for host countries is echoed by many scholars in the context of the global economic 
crisis. For example, Poulsen & Hu>auer (2011) recommend that policy makers not 
just further liberalize FDI regimes as a response to the FDI recession, as they have in 
the past, but also rethink their FDI policies with an enhanced focus on “sustainable 
FDI” promotion. !is refers to a=racting sustainable FDI to $t the country’s economic 
development objectives, including country- and sector-speci$c policies such as 
building foreign-local $rm linkages, providing for environmental sustainability, 
correcting for non-transparent and corrupt state institutions, and negotiating fairer 
contracts between host governments and multinational companies (MNCs). National 
goals related to FDI also include support of domestic $rms through potential spillovers 
into the host economy (Te Velde, 2001; Rugra+, 2008). Foreign corporate presence 
produces spillovers through the following channels: (1) act as a trigger for transfers of 
technology and know-how; (2) assist enterprise development and restructuring, not 
least in connection with privatization; (3) contribute to fuller international (trade) 
integration; (4) bolster business sector competition; and (5) support human capital 
formation in the host country (OECD, 2003).
!e economic nationalist theory poses a powerful challenge to liberal advice on 
economic development and the achievement of economic development objectives. 
As Jakobsen & Jakobsen (2011) assert, economic nationalism is closely related to the 
dependencia model. !is model views MNCs as contributing li=le to domestic economic 
development objectives, and has become an important component of the protectionist 
FDI discourse. !e adherents of economic nationalism are o#en intrinsically opposed 
to FDI, believing that MNCs only invest and operate to enrich themselves and their 
home nation. !e economic nationalism model is echoed in Nolke & Vliegenthart’s 
(2009) argument about the dependent market economy version of capitalism in CEE 
countries and the predominant, unhealthy importance of MNCs to CEE’s economies, 
as well as Rugra+ ’s (2008) negative evaluation of CEE FDI policy e+ectiveness in 
promoting indigenous $rms.
Overall, the literature on FDI has found out that the government’s economic 
openness position likely hinges on its views about the bene$ts and costs of FDI, as well 
as the proper and actual role of the state in economic policy. !us, on the one hand 
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Rugra+ (2008) suggests that the CEE states play only a limited role in the economy 
similar to the Irish model, and they permit full freedom of operation for MNCs, which 
tends not to promote spillovers and development of domestic $rms. On the other hand, 
scholars such as Schusselbauer (1999) have argued that the CEE state retains a critical 
role in the economy, in particular regarding privatization in the 1990s. State agencies 
maintained strong in<uence in industrial and structural policies, especially in sectors 
in distress. Sectors of strategic importance have been especially the target of political 
interventions to secure the state’s grip on economic development.
!e CEE governments were subjected to con<icting pressures during transition. First 
of all, they desired the transfer of technological and especially managerial know-how 
that local capital could not provide, due to the shortage and ine"ciency of local capital 
at the outset of transition. On the other hand, they had to balance the commitment to 
liberalization and internationalization (EU accession and membership) with sensitivity 
to increasing nationalism, including national security concerns, and maintenance of 
social cohesion and welfare (Martin, 1998). !us, when forming their FDI policies, 
CEE states had to respond to nationalist and national security concerns and public 
pressures for protection from FDI (Bandelj, 2002, 2008, 2009; Artisien-Maksimenko 
& Rojec, 2000; Kayalica & Lahiri, 2007, Zeng & Sherman, 2009). 
More speci$cally, during the initial years of post-communist transition there were 
public fears across the region that FDI makes a country vulnerable to foreign in<uence, 
that it results in a partial loss of sovereignty, and that national treasures are sold at low-
cost to the West. Such public fears were re<ected in less open FDI policies (Bandelj, 
2008). 
!e European Union membership actually helped political leaders counter the 
power of domestic protectionists and economic nationalism. Major changes within 
the EU’s FDI policy regime took place during transition, further enhancing trade and 
investment liberalization. In 1993, the EU gained the power to regulate member state 
treatment of incoming FDI, including from third countries (DOS, 2012). !e entry into 
force in December 2009 of the Lisbon Treaty changed EU jurisdiction over FDI issues 
in major respects. Article 207 of the Lisbon Treaty brought FDI under the umbrella 
of the EU common commercial policy, making it an exclusive EU competence. !e 
EU gained the ability to negotiate bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or investment 
chapters of Free Trade Agreements, subject to a “transitional mechanism” during which 
member state BITs with third countries would remain in force (DOS, 2012). In e+ect, 
the EU produced a “lock in” e+ect with regard to liberalization, as it represented an 
institutionalized commitment to liberal policies (e.g., Globerman et al., 2004). As a 
result, governments across Europe do not have to face protectionist interests alone.
2.2. National Security and Strategic Sectors
!e biggest way that host governments have used to restrict FDI in the economy is 
through claims of endangered national security. !is has been the case in many OECD 
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countries, including the United States, where regulatory frameworks have been used to 
deter investments in the infrastructure and energy sectors by private and public foreign 
investors.
Governments always claim to regulate FDI in the public interest, at the national 
and international levels. !e concept of national security, however, is typically not 
de$ned, making it at times di"cult to distinguish legitimate national security concerns 
from protectionist or other considerations. Countries try to maintain a broad scope of 
national security review and adopt self-judging national security clauses in international 
investment agreements. As Jongbloed et al. argued: “Although compromising national 
security is the most common concern of host countries involving sovereign FDI, 
‘national security’ is rarely de$ned in relevant legislation. Depending on the regulatory 
approach, national security either serves as a generally limiting concept (although broad 
in application), or merely provides an umbrella, under which other concerns, such as 
energy security, cluster” ( Jongbloed et al., 2012, p. 12). !e term national security is 
thus used very <exibly.
Under customary international law, endangered national security has been 
interpreted to mean an incident that poses a grave and imminent peril to a country, or a 
threat to such vital interests as political or economic survival, the continued functioning 
of its essential services, the maintenance of internal peace, the survival of a segment of 
its population, and the preservation of the environment of its territory. It also includes 
potential threats to the economy in the form of a loss of technology related to national 
security, a loss of jobs due to outsourcing, or a threat associated with state-backed 
investors who use their investments to advance political objectives.
As part of the general area of essential security concerns associated with foreign 
investment, numerous nations have focused on the concept of critical in"astructure 
as a separate area of concern within the rubric of essential security interests. Critical 
infrastructure typically includes systems and assets whose incapacity or destruction 
would have a debilitating impact on security – national economic security, national 
public health or safety, or any combination of those. !e key sectors included in national 
critical infrastructure plans across a number of developed countries – Australia, Canada, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union 
– are energy (including nuclear), communications, $nance, health care, food, water, 
transport, safety (emergency services), government, chemicals, and defense industrial 
base (OECD, 2008).
!e OECD acknowledges that sovereign governments have a right, and an obligation, 
to take measures to protect the public interest, including national security. It states that 
each country is best situated to assess its own security interests and to decide whether 
essential security interests are at stake relative to certain types of investments. At the 
same time the OECD suggests that excessive restrictions or hostility toward foreign 
investors could harm the host economies and lead to reciprocal action. !erefore, as 
the organization suggests, foreign investment should be restricted only when legitimate 
security and other essential interests are concerned (OECD, 2007a).
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Most scholars do acknowledge the legitimacy of national security concerns for FDI 
policy restrictions. Graham (1991), for one, asserts that FDI should not be restricted 
unless due to legitimate national security concerns. Marchick & Slaughter (2008), on 
the other hand, suggest that national security should not become a pretext for blocking 
FDI transactions due to protectionist or other exterior concerns. !ey further point 
out that with the increase in worldwide players in FDI, such as SWFs and SOEs, it is 
inevitable that political pressures to protect against FDI will develop. !ey conclude 
that a well-cra#ed and well-implemented FDI regime that takes into consideration 
national security can indeed increase investment rather than decrease it.
2.3. Sovereign Investment and Foreign State-Controlled Entities
Sovereign wealth funds and outward-investing state-owned enterprises from emerging 
markets have become both important and controversial players in the global economy, 
especially when investing in strategic sensitive sectors in the U.S. and Europe such as oil 
and energy companies, ports, and others. 
SWFs are special-purpose investment funds that are owned and controlled by 
governments taking stakes in foreign entities. To date, SWFs have taken mostly portfolio 
investments but they are increasingly taking majority stakes in companies, thus 
raising fears that governments would invest for strategic or political rather than purely 
economic considerations (Marchick & Slaughter, 2008). In recent years, the number 
of SWFs has proliferated. !ey are currently estimated to hold assets of approximately 
US$5.2 trillion, and this is expected to grow signi$cantly in the coming years (Golding, 
2014, p. 537).
State-owned enterprises are another vehicle of sovereign FDI. !ey have been at the 
forefront of sovereign intervention in the economy for centuries but they have increased 
their international expansion recently as a result of the rise of emerging markets and 
emerging-market multinationals. !e la=er have been buying assets in many economies 
and also pursuing green$eld opportunities. SOEs are much more signi$cant sovereign 
investment vehicles than SWFs by virtue of the amounts invested through them. !us 
China’s SOEs may account for over 80% of FDI out<ows and the country’s outward 
FDI stock.
SOEs also play an important role in the outward FDI of other emerging markets 
such as Russia ( Jongbloed et al., 2012, p. 10). In that regard Zubkovskaya & Michailova 
highlight the importance of the state in the internationalization processes of Russian 
enterprises. !ey $nd out that “the relationships between the federal government and 
$rms in strategic sectors in<uence the likelihood a company will internationalize. !e 
government is highly skilled in directing and redirecting resources as instruments to 
support or constrain companies’ internationalization” (2014, p. 64).
!e rise in frequency and magnitude of sovereign FDI has prompted increased 
concerns by policy makers in host countries, especially developed ones. Many 
arguments have been raised that these entities would endanger the national security 
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of the receiving countries. !e major concern is the belief that such investment has 
the potential to advance political and policy objectives of the home countries of such 
investment because governments are political entities with political, not commercial 
objectives. Jongbloed et al. (2012) have argued that investments by sovereign entities 
(SWFs and SOEs) re<ect both political and economic considerations and inevitably 
raise questions of political motivations and national security. Another concern is 
the issue that through such investments foreign governments might obtain access to 
sensitive technologies or secure control over natural resources, key industrial complexes 
or critical infrastructure. Lack of transparency regarding the structure, governance 
and investment strategies of sovereign investment vehicles is another principal area of 
concern for host countries. Furthermore, as FDI by state-controlled entities increases, 
it is likely to lead to international investment disputes – this in turn raises additional 
concerns. 
Proponents of sovereign investments argue, in contrast, that the opposition to deals 
with state-controlled entities is nothing more than disreputable, and possibly illegal 
investment protectionism. !ere is also li=le evidence that, for example, Chinese 
SOEs operating o+shore have engaged in non-commercial behavior (Golding, 2014, 
p. 541). Nonetheless, as Golding’s research of Australia’s experience with FDI by state-
controlled entities reveals, public perception of Chinese investment in Australia is one 
of general disapproval. In 2013, the Lowy Institute Poll reported that 57% of those 
surveyed had said that the Australian government was allowing too much investment 
from China (2014, p. 543).
National responses to sovereign investments have mostly concentrated on creating 
or ramping up already existing mandatory investment review mechanisms, with a 
strong national security focus. Some countries have established new FDI screening 
and national security review processes, or created additional tools for surveillance of 
all investments and scrutinizing acquisitions by government-owned companies or 
sovereign wealth funds while trying to avoid the need for umbrella security legislation.
2.4. Public Pressures and Le!ist-Rightist Political Ideologies
Public opinion is an essential part of the political landscape, with critical in<uence 
on public policy making through several channels (Dahl, 1982; Page & Shapiro, 
1983; Monroe, 1998). First, people’s opinions are decisive when they cast votes in 
elections. Second, they in<uence parties and governments through opinion polls. And 
third, there are additional ways of public participation in the political process, such as 
through organizing and mobilizing for political action, demonstrations, and lobbying. 
By extension, the le#-right political spectrum of the population is a critical factor for the 
ways that public opinion ma=ers for economic policy ( Jakobsen & Jakobsen, 2011).
For example, an international survey (with questions on FDI) has found out that 
citizens of CEE countries were more likely to want their governments to protect 
ownership from foreign in<uences and to give priority to domestic economic actors. 
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By 2000, all CEE countries had placed protections against foreign ownership of land 
(Bandelj, 2002, 2008), which were eventually to be removed by the EU membership, 
subject to a transition period of up to seven years.
Some authors have argued that le#-right political ideologies and politics are decisive 
for the political preferences on domestic versus foreign investment. !us research on 
trade has indicated that rightist ideology and right-leaning parties are more supportive 
of liberalization and economic openness than le#-wing or labor-based political parties 
(Milner & Judkins, 2004; Bailey et al., 1997; Irwin & Kroszner, 1999; Keech & Pak, 
1995). In that regard Brooks & Kurtz (2007) suggest that overall, rightist executives 
are more likely to liberalize trade; le#ist executives would also tend to liberalize trade, 
but less so on average.
Jakobsen & Jakobsen (2011), evaluating economic nationalism and FDI, have 
proposed a somewhat di+erent scheme of political preferences on FDI that casts doubt 
on the popular wisdom about the incompatibility of le#ist ideology with FDI. !ey 
argue, contrary to the popular wisdom, that le#-leaning societies in emerging markets 
should prefer liberal FDI policies, as according to the broad Stolper-Samuelson theory, 
labor in emerging markets tends to bene$t from FDI. On the other hand, domestic 
businesses in emerging markets tend to seek economic nationalist policies that protect 
them against competition from FDI. As rightist parties represent business, right-
leaning societies in emerging markets thus tend to restrict FDI. Jakobsen & Jakobsen’s 
argument, however, may be more applicable to the “South” than to the “East.” While all 
major parties across the CEE region – including socialist and nationalist – tend not to 
oppose FDI, rightist parties have tended to promote FDI to a greater extent.
3. !e Case of Bulgaria’s Foreign Direct Investment Protectionism  
in the Nuclear Energy Sector
3.1. Bulgaria’s Foreign Direct Investment Policy and National Security
Bulgaria, like some other CEE countries (such as Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, as well as 
Slovakia) has started from a more skeptical position on FDI before progressing, over the 
course of transition and EU membership, toward more open FDI policies. In the run up 
to the EU membership, Bulgaria sustained a liberal FDI regime. !e economic policies 
of all Bulgarian government cabinets – le#-leaning or rightist (see Appendix 1) – were 
built on the understanding that foreign investment is more than needed and desired. 
Practically, they proclaimed the a=raction of foreign investment as one of the key policy 
goals on their programs. A common understanding was that foreign investment helps 
improve the balance of payments, brings production and managerial know-how into 
the country, spurs the structural adjustment of enterprises, opens new market outlets, 
as well as makes up for the low savings rate in the economy (Petranov, 2003).
Bulgaria’s FDI policy went through several critical junctures. At the onset of the 
transition, the Bulgarian policy makers only sought to provide legal protection to FDI 
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within the territory of the country. In 1997, with the coming to power of the Kostov 
government of the center-right United Democratic Forces (UDF), Bulgaria began to 
actively seek the promotion of FDI. In 2004, as a result of the process of EU accession, 
a new critical juncture in Bulgaria’s FDI policy occurred. !e country switched to 
the promotion of all types of investment (domestic and foreign alike) on an equal 
basis. In the mid-2000s, the government focused on developing promising sectors 
of the economy for the a=raction of foreign investment, including energy, tourism, 
information technology, transportation, telecommunications, and agriculture. Overall, 
the Bulgarian legislation seeks to promote rather than restrict FDI, in line with EU laws 
and regulations. It permits standard business by foreigners on equal terms for EU and 
EFTA non-resident persons, and provides for the principles of non-discrimination and 
national treatment of foreign investors.
At the same time, however, Bulgarian political discourse clearly manifested some 
country-of-origin preferences for foreign investment. A=racting American as well as 
European FDI became one of the top priorities of all government cabinets. Investments 
from neighboring countries such as Turkey and Greece were not viewed so highly 
(Iankova, 2009; CSD, 1993) mostly because of the numerous cases of sweatshop work 
conditions that investors in the apparel industry from Greece and Turkey became 
famous for in the initial years of transition. Investments from China, in contrast, are 
viewed favorably (Xiaoming, 2014), while investments from Russia have been both 
welcomed and opposed, depending on their concrete type, level of transparency and 
the speci$c interests behind them. Table 1 presents the distribution of FDI by country 
of origin and demonstrates that the majority of FDI stock in Bulgaria has come from 
Western European countries. Russia occupies the seventh place a#er the Netherlands, 
Austria, Greece, the U.K., Germany and Cyprus. FDI in<ows from transition countries 
such as Hungary and the Czech Republic have been an important development in the 
recent years (Sakali, 2013, pp. 77-78).
TABLE 1. FDI in Bulgaria by Country of Origin, 1996-2014 (Euro Million)
1. !e Netherlands 7,023.30
2. Austria 5,944.70
3. Greece 3,580.80







Source: InvestBulgaria Agency, 2015.
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Bulgaria adopted for the $rst time a Concept for National Security in 1998. !e 
Concept was later incorporated into the Law for the Defense of Classi$ed Information 
and the Law on the National State Security Agency. A new practice was also developed 
for the regular accountability of the government to the National Assembly in terms of 
the state of national security and the adopted policies and measures for the defense of 
the national interests. !e Concept played an important role by outlining the values, 
principles and mechanisms of the national security policies to the Bulgarian public at 
large and the country’s NATO allies. In 2005 and 2008 there were dra# projects for 
strategies in the sphere of national security but they were not adopted by the National 
Assembly.
A Strategy for National Security was adopted by the National Assembly on March 3, 
2011.1 It builds upon “the values of democracy” among other national and international 
values and conditions. !e strategy is based on a “broader understanding of national 
security,” taking into consideration the security of the citizen, the society and the 
economy, in addition to defense, foreign policy, intelligence, public order and law 
enforcement. As the Strategy states: “!e $nal product and essence of the term ‘national 
security’ is the security of the individual citizens and the security of their freedom and 
dignity.”
In light of Bulgaria’s accession to NATO and the EU, the country’s national security 
strategy became part of the broader supranational security e+orts of the allies at the 
EU and NATO levels. Bulgaria’s national security is thus based on the “indivisibility of 
the national security from the security of NATO and the EU.” !e relations between 
Bulgaria and Russia, from the perspective of foreign investment and national security, 
are thus de$ned under the umbrella of the EU and NATO: “Bulgaria actively participates 
in the formation and realization of the relations of the EU and NATO with the Russian 
Federation.”
!e Strategy is further based on a “dialogue and broad partnership between the 
citizens, the society and the state,” and on “openness, transparency and responsibility in 
the formation and implementation of the national security policies.” !e strategy also 
outlines speci$c sectoral policies for national security, such as $nancial and economic 
security, social security, energy security, natural environment, law and order, foreign 
policy, and defense.
Energy security is regarded as an important part of national security and a 
prerequisite for economic stability. !e Strategy includes as a goal to “guarantee the 
energy security through diversi$cation of the types of energy, sources and channels 
for the delivery of energy and other strategic raw materials.” Domestically, “the high 
dependency on energy resources creates weaknesses in economic and political aspects.” 
!e projects for diversi$cation of the sources and channels for the delivery of energy 
resources are considered to have an impact on the geopolitical environment in the 
1 Strategija za natsionalna sigurnost na Republika Bylgaria (Strategy for National Security of the Republic of 
Bulgaria), adopted with a National Assembly Decision on March 3, 2011, and published in State Gaze=e 
No. 19 on March 8, 2011.
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Balkans and Europe and a direct impact on the national security of Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s 
energy security is regarded as an integral part of the EU energy security. As the Strategy 
states: “Bulgaria is interested in the establishment of a common energy policy of the EU. 
It supports the EU strategic initiatives for the creation of the necessary infrastructure 
and the diversi$cation of energy sources.” !e development of Bulgaria’s nuclear energy 
in particular is viewed as having a strategic importance for the national security of the 
country. !e building of new nuclear power sources is supported institutionally in 
Bulgaria, as a prospective resource for the production of non-emission electric power 
and because of the successful experience with nuclear energy during the socialist past 
and the existing professional capacity.
3.2. Bulgaria’s Nuclear Energy Sector and Accession to the European Union
Bulgaria inherited a confused and dysfunctional energy sector from its socialist past, 
dominated by monopolies and lack of transparency (Zaimov, 2013). Since 1956, the 
Bulgarian government has favored the use of nuclear power for electricity. In 1966, it 
signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for the provision of commercial units which 
would become the basis of Bulgaria’s nuclear program. In the 1970s, the Kozloduy 
nuclear power plant was built at the border with Romania near the Danube River, 
with six reactors commissioned between 1974 and 1991. !e $rst pair of reactors were 
VVER-440 model V-230; the second VVER-440 pair incorporated many of the much-
improved safety features of the V-213 model. !e third pair were the larger VVER-1000 
units, model V-320 (see Tables 2 & 3).
TABLE 2. Shutdown nuclear power reactors in Bulgaria
Reactor Type Model Net MWe First power Shutdown
Kozloduy 1 VVER-440 V-230 405 7/1974 12/2002









Source: Nuclear Power in Bulgaria (August 2012). h=p://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf87.html 
TABLE 3. Operating nuclear power reactors in Bulgaria
Reactor Type Model Net MWe First power
Kozloduy 5 VVER-1000 V-320 953 11/1987
Kozloduy 6 VVER-1000 V-320 953 8/1991
Total (2) 1906
Source: Nuclear Power in Bulgaria (August 2012). h=p://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf87.html 
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A second site was chosen near Belene, some 7.5 km from Bulgaria’s Danube River 
border with Romania, and approved in 1981 by the government for the construction 
of a second NPP. !e design of the plant envisaged the construction of four VVER-
1000/V 320 nuclear reactors. Site works started in 1981 and construction of the $rst 
VVER-1000 V-320 unit – in 1987. When in 1989 the communist government fell, 
about 40% of the construction work of reactor 1 had been $nished and 80% of the 
equipment had been supplied. !e project was put on hold in 1991 and $nally dropped 
in 1992 for environmental and economic reasons. Only conservation work continued 
to be undertaken with the goal to preserve the supplied equipment, the construction 
site and the buildings.
!e energy sector and the nuclear program in particular experienced a heavy blow 
with the country’s accession to the EU. In 1995, six Soviet nuclear power plants in the 
post-communist region were assessed to have an “abnormally high accident likelihood” 
by the O"ce of Energy Intelligence, an arm of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 
!ese were Chernobyl (Ukraine), Metsamor (Armenia), Kozloduy (Bulgaria), Ignalina 
(Lithuania), Kola (Russia), and Bohunice (Slovakia). According to the DOE, these 
NPPs posed signi$cant safety and environmental risks due to their inherent design 
de$ciencies, deteriorating economies and political turmoil, and a weak regulatory 
oversight in the respective countries. Kozloduy’s nuclear reactors 1 and 2 (VVER 
440/230’s) were called the “timebomb of Europe.” 
During Bulgaria’s EU accession negotiations, the European Union exerted strong 
pressure on the country to shut down the unsafe nuclear reactors at its Kozloduy NPP. 
!e European Commission’s position was that these units could not be made safe at 
a reasonable price. It demanded the closure of units 1-2 by the end of 2002, and the 
closure of units 3-4 by the end of 2006. Bulgaria agreed to decommission Kozloduy’s 
two oldest reactors in 2002 but wanted units 3 and 4 to stay in operation until 2008 
and 2010, respectively. Bulgaria argued that it could not yet a+ord the shutdown costs 
(Mudeva, 2002). Early closure would end Bulgaria’s role as the leading power exporter 
in the region and raise domestic power bills. Kozloduy’s six reactors produced 3,760 
megawa=s, half of Bulgaria’s energy2 and were of vital importance to the country’s 
domestic needs. Bulgaria also covered nearly half of the region’s annual electricity 
de$cit with power exports. And, being more than 70 percent dependent on external 
energy sources (mostly from Russia), Bulgaria would further increase this dependence 
with the closure of the Kozloduy four units.3
!e Commission stayed $rm about the closure of the Kozloduy units 3 and 4, 
however, as a condition for Bulgaria’s entry into the EU. !e Bulgarian government 
reluctantly agreed to close them in December 2006 before the end of their lifespan. 
!e two newest units of the Kozloduy NPP, 5 and 6, which provide about a quarter of 
Bulgaria’s electricity, had not been considered for shutdown. 
2 According to some reports, the number is 40 percent but still this is a very high number.
3 OMRI Daily Digest, 19 December 1995.
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!e cost of the shutdowns of units 1-4 has been estimated at Euro 3 billion, partly 
due to the lack of a surplus of electricity for export to neighboring countries such 
as Greece, Turkey, Serbia and Macedonia. !e EU provided compensation for the 
closures in the amount of Euro 850 million (including an extra Euro 300 million for 
decommissioning, clean-up and waste which was granted in 2009).
Similar shutdowns of Soviet-era reactors had to take place in Slovakia and Lithuania, 
and the la=er’s last Ignalina reactor was set to close at the end of 2009. Both these 
countries, as well as Bulgaria, have sought to replace old nuclear with new nuclear 
reactors with the plan in Bulgaria to build two large pressurized water reactors at Belene. 
!e compensation provided by the EU for the early decommissioning of the two 
Kozloduy reactors was not regarded as su"cient to resolve the issue of rising domestic 
electricity bills and maintaining Bulgaria’s role as the leading electricity exporter in 
the region. !e second nuclear power plant project at the Belene site on the Danube 
River was expected to $ll the gap in energy supply le# by the early closure of the older 
Kozloduy reactors, and was revived in the late 1990s.
3.3. Russia as a Sovereign Investor in Bulgaria
Sha+er (2009) has analyzed the role of Russia’s energy sector in politics and policies, 
and has concluded that the sector has been “intricately intertwined” with Russia’s 
political leadership, both formally and informally. !us formally, senior Kremlin o"cials 
sit on the boards of the major state-controlled entities such as Gazprom and Rosne#. 
!ere is also a “revolving door” for o"cials between the formal political structure 
and the leadership of the state-controlled companies. “State-controlled entities are 
thus compelled at times to undertake tasks determined by the state” (Sha+er, 2009, 
p. 121). Kuznetsov (2011) argues in a similar fashion that while it is false to say that 
any signi$cant part of Russian outward FDI services Russian foreign policy, political 
aspects of outward FDI decisions are taken into account in many cases.
!e location destination of Russian sovereign investment, including in the nuclear 
energy sector, is explained by the most prominent FDI theories, including the Uppsala 
theory of the internationalization of the $rm. !us short psychological distance, low 
language and cultural barriers as well as strong economic and political ties inherited 
from the Soviet period, play an important role for the expansion of Russian SOEs 
towards the countries from the former Soviet Union and the Balkan Slavic countries. 
As Kuznetsov explains, many Russian MNEs do not have much experience in foreign 
investment activities and therefore usually prefer to buy companies or to establish 
new a"liates only under the familiar conditions of the former communist countries, 
especially those with a favorable a=itude to Russia. Countries such as Bulgaria, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Latvia, Belarus, Armenia and Uzbekistan may not be so popular 
among foreign investors globally. However, such countries can a=ract signi$cant Russian 
investment due to strong cultural and language ties, already developed industrial chains 
and inherited business contacts from the Soviet period, and other advantages of the so-
called “neighborhood e+ect” (Kuznetsov, 2011).
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In Bulgaria, for one, as Table 1 demonstrates, Russia holds the seventh position of 
FDI in<ows by country of origin for the period 1996-2014, with almost 2 billion euro 
invested (InvestBulgaria, 2015). As many observers have noted, Russian in<uence 
in Bulgaria has been strong and considered somewhat special. Bulgaria owes its 
independence from the O=oman Empire to Russia’s victory in the Russo-Turkish 
War (1877-78). Following the war, the Bulgarian state was reinstated a#er a period of 
$ve centuries under O=oman rule. Bulgaria has maintained a strong relationship with 
Russia throughout the 20th century, despite being on the opposite side against Russia 
in World War I and World War II. !us Bulgaria refused to join the a=ack against the 
Soviet Union, even though it was allied with Nazi Germany. !e communist period in 
Bulgaria’s history did not produce strong anti-Russian feelings, protests and uprisings 
as was the case in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. While Bulgaria’s a"nity with 
Russia can be easily traced deep into the countries’ cultural and religious similarities, 
there are also important geopolitical reasons that grease the wheels of the relationship, 
as Marco Papic wrote. Bulgaria has o#en relied on Russia to play the role of its protector 
and champion in the region. Meanwhile, Bulgaria provides Russia with a reliable 
foothold in the Balkans and control of the Black Sea coastline (Papic, 2012).
A#er the collapse of the communist regime in 1989 Bulgaria continued to maintain 
close ties with Russia, partly because of the relative weakness of the Bulgarian 
democratic opposition in the initial years of transition. !ose good relations, however, 
did not eliminate Bulgaria’s extreme dependence on Russian gas and oil. In 2007 Russia 
provided 92% of the roughly 4 billion cubic meters of natural gas delivered by Bulgargaz, 
the state-run gas monopoly. Bulgaria’s Ne#ochim Burgas, the biggest re$nery in the 
Balkans, is controlled by Lukoil, and the country’s Kozloduy nuclear power plant uses 
Russian fuel (TOL, 2009).
4. Main Findings: !e Re-Launch and Halt of the Belene Nuclear Power 
Plant Project
4.1. Re-Launch of the Belene NPP Project
In 2002, when units 1 and 2 of the Kozloduy NPP were shut down, the Bulgarian 
government of then Prime Minister and former Bulgarian king Simeon Saxe-Coburg 
put the Belene project back on the agenda despite the controversies which surrounded 
it. !ese were mostly environmental issues and in particular seismic risks. A large 
earthquake had hit the region in 1977 and killed over 120 people only 14 km from 
the planned NPP site. Early in 2005, the government approved the construction of 
Belene as a two-unit 2000 MW plant (see Table 4). In May 2005, the National Electric 
Company (NEK) of Bulgaria launched a procedure for the selection of a contractor 
for the engineering, procurement, and commissioning (EPC) of the Belene NPP, units 
1&2.
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TABLE 4. Planned and proposed nuclear power reactors in Bulgaria




Belene 1 VVER-1000 (AES-92) V-466 1000 cancelled -










Source: Nuclear Power in Bulgaria (August 2012). Retrieved from h=p://www.world-nuclear.org/
info/inf87.html 
!e outgoing government of Simeon Saxe-Coburg le# the selection of the EPC 
contractor to the new government which was to come to power a#er the 2005 general 
elections in the country. !e elections brought to power a new coalition government 
dominated by the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Its leader Sergei Stanishev became Bulgaria’s 
new prime minister.
In late October 2006, NEK chose a consortium led by Russia’s state-owned company 
AtomStroyExport (ASE), a subsidiary of Rosatom, over a Skoda-led consortium to build 
the plant. Rosatom regulates and runs Russia’s entire nuclear complex, both civil and 
weaponry. Established in 2007, Rosatom has soon become one of the biggest nuclear 
energy companies in the world through aggressive expansion of its nuclear power plants 
division into various markets (mostly developing and emerging). Rosatom is currently 
engaged in the construction of 29 new nuclear reactors in Kudankulam (India), Akkuyu 
(Turkey), Belarus, Vietnam, Bangladesh and China. !e company is also in various 
stages of negotiations and planning for the construction of nuclear reactors in more 
than ten additional countries.4 Rosatom’s goal is to increase its share in the global 
market of operating NPPs from 2% to 17% in the period 2015-2019.5
In addition to ASE, the winning consortium comprised the French company 
Framatome (Areva) and Germany’s Siemens. A 4 billion euro contract was signed6 
for the delivery of two third-generation VVER 1000/V-466B reactors in an AES-92 
4 Rosatom’s website h=p://www.rosatom.ru/en/nuclear_industry/russian_nuclear_industry/ . See also in 
!oburn (2015).
5 Statement from Rosatom Concern’s website, h=p://www.rosenergoatom.ru/wps/wcm/connect/
rosenergoatom_copy/site_en/about/
6 !ere are contradictory reports as to whether the Stanishev government had signed or not signed a 
formal contract with Atomstroyexport. !at socialist government had been strongly criticized later by 
its successor, the center-right government of Boyko Borisov, for failing to sign a formal contract with the 
Russian company.
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nuclear power station. !e units will be similar to those being built by ASE at Tianwan 
in China. !e company’s AES-92 VVER-1000 reactors will be operated using control 
and automation systems from an Areva/Siemens consortium called Carsib, while 100 
Russian $rms would also contribute. Such reactors are already under construction 
at Kudankulam in India, while two earlier AES-91 units were already operational at 
Tianwan in China. ASE was also close to $nishing the Bushehr nuclear power plant in 
Iran (see Appendix 2 about Rosatom’s international nuclear power plant projects).
As the socialist-led coalition government publicly announced, the ASE o+er had been 
selected on the basis of its “highest safety level guaranteed by several new independent 
active and passive safety systems,” as well as the option for ASE to buy back the old 
unit supplied in the 1980s. !e Belene plant would boast a “unique combination of 
active and passive safety systems.”7 Prime Minister Sergei Stanishev called the project “a 
Renaissance for Bulgaria’s nuclear energy” and “the largest industrial project in Bulgaria 
in the last eighteen years.” ASE announced that its success with the tender should “open 
up new prospects for Russian nuclear technology in Europe.”8
In December 2006, Bulgarian regulators approved the Belene site for new build, and 
in December 2007 the project received approval from the European Commission. It 
issued a “favorable opinion” of $nancial arrangements to build two new nuclear reactors 
at Belene, stating that all requirements of articles 41 to 44 of the Euratom Treaty had 
been met. European Commission approval of any nuclear project in the EU is required 
under the Euratom Treaty. A favorable opinion of the European Commission is also 
one of the requirements for a potential Euratom loan. On September 3, 2008, the 
construction of the Belene NPP o"cially started (see Appendix 3 with key information 
about the project). 
In 2006, Stanishev’s socialist government hired BNP Paribas SA, France’s largest 
bank by market value, as a $nancial advisor to the Belene NPP project. !e Bank had 
to coordinate the $nancing of the NPP project – arrange for a Euro 250 million loan 
to help fund construction of the plant, assess the $nancial risks and prepare tenders to 
select banks for funding the project. !e plant’s estimated cost at that time was Euro 4 
billion. Later on the cost was estimated at around Euro 10 billion. In 2006, Deutsche 
Bank, UniCredit and ten other large commercial banks all turned down invitations to 
$nance the project. In 2008 and 2009, several large energy companies also turned down 
invitations to become investors in the project. NEK’s poor results, combined with the 
$nancial crisis, forced it to breach the conditions on the Euro 250 million loan making 
it callable. Later on, in 2009, the country had to either return the money or negotiate an 
extension of the loan, which would cost BGN 20 million a year.
7 !e unsuccessful bid by the Skoda-led alliance proposed the upgrading of V-320 VVER units similar 
to those built by the company at Temelin in the Czech Republic. Westinghouse would have provided 
instrumentation and control had that bid been accepted.
8 !is and all sources and quotes that follow are news reports published by Novinite.com (So$a Morning 
News Agency).
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4.2. In Search for a Strategic Investor: RWE’s Involvement and Withdrawal  
"om the Project
Bulgaria then looked for a strategic investor in the Belene NPP who would own and 
operate the plant for a stake of up to 49% in it, while NEK would hold a majority control 
of 51%. Six companies were invited by NEK to submit preliminary bids. In October 
2008, NEK selected the German company RWE Power as the preferred strategic 
partner. According to a statement from NEK, RWE had emerged as the preferred 
bidder a#er scoring higher than its rivals in an assessment exercise based on criteria 
ranging from price considerations, through involvement in future plant operations, to 
decommissioning and waste management. 
In December 2008, an agreement was signed between NEK and RWE Power. Under 
the contract, RWE would receive a share of 49% of the Belene plant in exchange for 
a capital payment of €1.275 billion ($1.736 billion) (equity stake) in the project, a 
premium of Euro 550 million for NEK, and a loan of Euro 300 million ($409 million) 
for the purchase of equipment and other expenditures. According to NEK, RWE’s €300 
million corporate loan could be made available for the ordering of long lead-time plant 
components in advance of the $nancial closure of the deal, expected by the end of 2009.
A#er signing the contract with Bulgaria’s NEK, RWE had come under heavy criticism 
in Germany from the public and several key shareholders for its participation in the 
Belene project. !e key criticisms focused on issues of safety, economics, environment 
and corruption. Some 30,000 German citizens sent le=ers and petitions to RWE’s CEO 
asking him to withdraw from the project.
RWE sought to reduce its risk by trying to $nd other partners. Discussions with 
GdF-Suez were held in May 2009 and there was speculation that a deal could involve 
that company’s subsidiary, Electrabel. Such a move would enable RWE to hedge its 
risks. Electrabel / GdF Suez withdrew its interest in early 2009, however. In late spring 
2009, RWE announced that it had been in talks with Inter\O from Russia, Fortum 
from Finland and two unnamed Swedish companies for participation in its 49-percent 
stake.
RWE furthermore sought to reduce its risk by refusing to invest any money in the 
Belene project as long as there had been no clarity about how NEK’s 51-percent stake 
was to be $nanced. In May 2009, Sergei Stanishev’s outgoing socialist government 
accepted the o+er of then Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin for a loan of Euro 3.9 
Billion to Bulgaria for the construction of the Belene NPP. !e Bulgarian government 
would provide a 100-percent guarantee for it. In response to this announcement, 
Greenpeace alerted the European Commission that the government guarantees would 
be an illegal state aid. 
!e July 2009 general elections brought to power Boyko Borisov (a former bodyguard 
and Mayor of So$a) and his center-right Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 
(GERB) party. Boyko Borisov took the post of Prime Minister over promises of release 
of the EU program funds for Bulgaria, eradication of corruption and organized crime, 
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political and economic reforms, and reassessment of joint energy projects with Russia 
so that Bulgaria would be no longer perceived as Russia’s Trojan horse in the EU. 
Boyko Borisov’s government decided to conduct a new assessment of the feasibility 
of the Belene project and its prospects for funding. !e reassessment concluded 
$rst that the budget of 4 billion Euro had not been realistic and that construction 
costs would be in the range of Euro 10 billion. Total cost of the new plant in<ated to 
September 2009 had come to some €6 billion. Including owner’s costs, infrastructure, 
grid uprating, site works, project management and $nance the project costs would rise 
to about €10 billion. !e reassessment had further found out that around Euro 500 
million had already been invested in the project, from which tens of millions of euro 
had been unaccounted for. Furthermore, according to the prime minister, there had 
been lack of transparency in the way Bulgaria’s previous government had spent BNP 
Paribas’ syndicated loan for the launch of the construction of the Belene plant.
Unlike Stanishev’s government, the Borisov government has not been willing to 
provide any state guarantees for loans from Russia. Bulgarian energy experts and some 
rightist parties had called for a halt, saying the loan would translate into a BGN 1,300 tax 
burden for each Bulgarian taxpayer, electricity hikes for decades on end, and outdated 
and dubious Russian nuke units.
Russia’s image as a reliable supplier of energy, and overall as a somewhat special 
partner to Bulgaria had been badly damaged by Moscow’s halt in gas deliveries in January 
of 2009. Of all the countries along the supply chain via Ukraine to Europe, Bulgaria had 
been hit the hardest as it is almost 100 percent dependent on Russian gas and it has 
no viable pipeline options for emergency deliveries from neighboring countries. !e 
crisis situation demonstrated the urgency of energy supply diversi$cation in Bulgaria 
and the re-examination of the three projects in the energy sector that had been under 
negotiation with Russia: $rst, Gazprom’s South Stream gas pipeline; second, the Burgas-
Alexandropolis oil pipeline, a project of the Rosne#, Transne#, and Gazpromne# 
companies; and third, the Belene NPP project. On the other hand, many in Bulgaria 
were also considering the bene$ts from the Russian projects, such as transit revenue 
and job creation in the country, if those projects were implemented.
Bulgaria has also relied on Brussels for partial project $nance. By the end of 2009, 
Brussels had been expected to pay all Euro 550 million ($800 million) of the promised 
compensation for the early decommissioning of Kozloduy’s units 3 and 4 in 2006. 
Bulgaria had hoped to receive further aid under the EU’s recovery plan and in October 
2009, Bulgaria had been granted additional Euro 300 million ($440 million) over three 
years from 2010 onwards. !e grant would help the country adapt and improve its 
energy networks and would take the overall compensation package to Euro 850 million 
($1.2 billion).
At the end of October 2009, a#er a long period of uncertainty, public pressure 
and inability to $nd a junior partner to share its stake in the Belene NPP project, the 
German utility company RWE abandoned its potential 49-percent investment in the 
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project. A year later, in December 2010, diplomatic cables on WikiLeaks revealed 
that RWE abandoned plans to participate in the construction of the Belene NPP a#er 
realizing that working with Russian and Bulgarian companies in the energy sector had 
been a “poisonous combination” for European investment. !e cables, published by 
the Guardian newspaper claimed that the deal “reeked of side deals” even before RWE 
bought the 49 percent stake. RWE was said to be “in the dark” on most on-site and 
technical issues. !e lack of clear $nancing structure of the project has been another 
important reason for RWE’s withdrawal. According to o"cial government statements, 
RWE le# Bulgaria’s Belene project in 2009 because of lack of $nancing and lack of an 
EPC contract for the project.
A#er two years of e+orts, $nancial advisor BNP Paribas had to concede and 
withdraw from the project in February 2010 as it couldn’t $nd any bank willing to lend 
money for the Bulgarian share of the project cost.
4.3. Freezing of the Project
!roughout 2009, concern had been expressed as to whether the project had been 
a+ordable for Bulgaria. Responding to such concerns, the government announced in 
September 2009 that it would cut its share in the project from 51% to 20-30%, which 
would still allow the country to keep its blocking quota.
In mid-February 2010, Russia o+ered a Euro 2 billion loan for Belene, to $nance 
construction activities until a strategic investor was found, without the requirement 
for any state guarantees on behalf of the Bulgarian government. According to the o+er, 
the funds would be repaid by a future investor or some could remain invested on a 
permanent basis through a share in Belene’s equity capital. !e o+er demonstrated 
Russia’s determination to build the Belene NPP even at a very high price. !e 
motivations could be easily found in Russia’s strategic geopolitical interests and much 
less so in the future high pro$tability potential of the plant. !e Belene NPP, paid with 
Russian money, built with Russian design, technology and equipment, using Russian 
raw nuclear material and resources, would be poised to become the Federation’s own 
nuclear center inside the EU.
While the deal had been agreed in principle with the Borisov government, the 
terms had not been $nalized and in March 2010 the government declined the Russian 
$nancing o+er, stating that it would freeze the construction of the Belene plant until 
it $nds “European money” and a “strategic foreign investor.” According to an o"cial 
statement of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the decision of the Borisov government to 
abandon the Belene project would be a “sin” that would lead in a few years to the import 
of electricity from Turkey.
In a response to the Borisov government’s new energy course, Russia decided to 
tie the South Stream pipeline project with Bulgaria’s Belene project. Russia’s Gazprom 
threatened to change the course of the South Stream gas transit pipeline project to 
exclude Bulgaria and replace it with Romania. Instead of surfacing near Bulgaria’s city 
of Varna, the pipeline could run to Romania.
 55
4.4. Rosatom and Revival of the Project
Following a visit of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Zubkov to Bulgaria in July 2010, 
the Borisov government began working on an agreement with Russia to postpone a 
Euro 280 million down payment due to Russia for the production of the $rst unit at 
Belene. !e payment had been due in 2010 but Bulgaria had not been able to secure the 
budget means for it. 
Borisov’s U-turn towards the revival of the Belene project fueled a new round of 
public criticisms. !e major concern was the cost of the Belene project which was 
estimated to exceed 10 billion euros, making electricity exports unpro$table. Additional 
criticisms focused on the environmental risks, the danger of seismic activity in the 
region and, last but not least, Bulgaria’s energy dependence on Russia. Borisov’s U-turn 
had fueled also suspicions about links in the energy sector between the ma$a and the 
political system.
In December 2010, shortly a#er a visit to So$a by then Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin, Bulgaria’s NEK and Rosatom signed a non-binding memorandum. !e 
memorandum had called for a new project company – the Belene Power Company – to 
be established by April 2011 and for construction to resume before October 2011. NEK 
would have a share of 51% in the Belene Power Company; Rosatom – a share of 47%; 
Finnish company Fortum – a share of 1%; and French company Altran Technologies – 
a share of 1% with an option to increase it. Development of the plant’s economic model 
and the selection of investors had to be carried out by HSBC, which had been selected 
by the Bulgarian Energy Holding as the project consultant in November 2010.
Several issues had remained to be resolved, however, notably the cost of the project 
and the price that Bulgaria had to pay Russia for the construction of the plant. A price 
of Euro 6.298 billion had been set in the memorandum between Rosatom and NEK. 
Subsequently, however, the Bulgarian government made it clear that it wanted a lower 
price, perhaps as low as Euro 5 billion. !e original price in the 2008 contract between 
NEK and Rosatom’s subsidiary AtomStroyExport for the construction of the plant had 
been set at Euro 3.997 billion plus any respective escalation costs to be factored in later.
In February 2011, a#er continuing disagreements over the price, Bulgarian Prime 
Minister Borisov had come up with threats to scrap again the Belene NPP project. In 
March 2011, the Russian government gave Bulgaria an ultimatum on the price, se=ing it 
at 6.3 billion euro as a $xed price, following Bulgaria’s insistence on a $xed price or one 
that would not allow for additional “escalation costs” over in<ation and other factors. 
4.5. #e Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and the European Commission’s Reexamination 
of the Belene NPP Project
In March 2011, amidst Japan’s nuclear emergency with the Fukushima NPP, the 
European Commission decided to reexamine Bulgaria’s Belene NPP project, following 
an emergency meeting of the EU energy ministers. !ey had agreed to conduct stress-
tests on all NPPs operating in the Union. Germany had decided to freeze its planned 
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extension of the life of its NPPs. !e European Commission declared that Bulgaria’s 
Belene needed additional technological and geological safety studies all along with 
its questionable $nancing regardless of the fact that in 2008 the Commission had 
o"cially approved the construction of the Belene NPP. !e Commission made it 
clear that its earlier positive position for the construction of the Belene plant had to be 
reconsidered; that it would issue a new position on the project and would then observe 
if its recommendations are met.
In March 2011, the Borisov government decided to tie up the Belene nuclear 
project with the new EU nuclear safety requirements and the anticipated HSBC report. 
It signed an agreement with Russia for a three-month moratorium on the project. 
!e moratorium would be in place until the exact price of the NPP construction is 
calculated, a full assessment of seismology risks prepared, and all other debatable 
issues cleared. !e parties had commi=ed also to the signing by June 1, 2011 of an 
engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract for building a NPP at 
Belene. !at last arrangement (made in the “notorious” Annex 12 to the agreement) 
was actually mandating the sides to build the plant and led to a huge scandal within the 
Bulgarian government.
It remained an open question whether the signed document was legally binding 
for Bulgaria. !e Belene blunder prompted the opposition to initiate debates in the 
national parliament as well as to approach the European Parliament with a proposal 
for imposing a moratorium on the launch and construction of new NPPs across the 
European Union, which could have a+ected Bulgaria’s project for a second NPP at 
Belene. !e members of the European Parliament remained divided over the future of 
nuclear energy in Europe, and the so called resolution on nuclear safety in Europe had 
been rejected by 264 votes in favor, 300 against, and 61 abstentions, in early April 2011. 
Meanwhile in April 2011, the European Commission had decided to stage an all-out 
probe of the Belene nuclear project by the end of 2011, amidst growing safety concerns 
generated by the crisis in Japan’s Fukushima NPP.
4.6. International Arbitration: NEK and Rosatom’s Legal Claims over Belene
In June 2011, the Russian side  came up with a new ultimatum: construction of the 
plant had to be launched by March 2012, otherwise the project would be considered 
unpro$table for Russia. At the same time the Borisov government had declared that 
it wanted to freeze the project for three additional months, as of July. Rosatom had 
threatened to take Bulgaria to an international arbitration if it missed the July 1 deadline 
for signing a $nal agreement for the construction of the Belene NPP. !e Bulgarian side 
had insisted that the price of Euro 6.3 billion demanded by the Russian side had been 
way too high and unacceptable, and had argued for a price ceiling of EUR 5 billion. 
!e Bulgarian government wanted to extend the deadline to provide more time for the 
consultant on the project, HSBC, to $gure out whether the planned NPP would be 
economically feasible. !e government and Prime Minister Boyko Borisov in particular 
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had made it clear that the results of the HSBC $nancial appraisal would be decisive 
with respect to the government’s $nal decision on whether or not to go ahead with the 
project.
At the end of June 2011, Bulgaria and Russia had reached an agreement to extend 
the negotiations over the Belene nuclear project by another three months as of July. 
However, in July 2011 the Belene project had experienced another huge drawback – 
mutual $nancial claims had been raised by both the Russian and the Bulgarian partners 
over sums allegedly owed for the delivery of new equipment and the buyout of old 
equipment for the future plant. !us Atomstroyexport $led an EUR 58 million suit 
against NEK with the International Arbitration Court in Paris, and NEK threatened 
to respond with a EUR 61 million compensation suit against Russia at the Arbitration 
Court of the International Chamber of Commerce in Geneva. !e lawsuit was $led 
later on, in October 2011.
Despite these claims, high-level negotiations continued on implementing the 
project, particularly its $nancial structuring. Meanwhile the project’s consultant, HSBC, 
had come up with its $rst conclusions, which showed that there were ways to make 
Belene pro$table. In early October 2011, ASE and NEK signed a supplement to their 
agreement on the construction of the Belene plant, agreeing to extend the negotiations 
over Belene by another six months or until the end of March 2012. !is had already 
been the 15th time when the construction of the plant by the Russian company had 
been delayed with annexes.
In December 2011, amid court claims Russia o+ered a “unique” bargain for the Belene 
NPP – that is, to single-handedly $nance the $nishing of the Belene NPP. As a Rosatom 
o"cial commented on the Bulgarian National Radio: “Given our proposal, Bulgaria 
will have to invest not a penny more than it already has, ge=ing in return 51-percent 
ownership over a brand new nuclear power plant.” !e Bulgarian side declined the o+er, 
however. Prime Minister Borisov announced that the Belene NPP would not be just a 
Bulgarian-Russian project, and that communication with the European Commission 
and leading European countries would be crucial for the future of the Belene project.
4.7. Termination of the Project: Political Reactions  
and a National Nuclear Referendum
!e Fukushima disaster and the European Commission’s determination to re-
examine the Belene project, combined with continuing disagreements between NEK 
and Rosatom over its price, as well as the government’s decision to add a large-scale 
European or American private investor to the project when not a single such investor 
had expressed any interest, led to the o"cial termination of the project in March 
2012. !e nuclear reactor for Belene, which had been completed by that time and for 
which Bulgaria had already paid approximately 60 percent of the cost, is planned to be 
transferred and installed at Bulgaria’s Kozloduy NPP.
A factor that has been continuously emphasized as critical for the termination of 
the project was its staggering price, estimated by the consultants from HSBC at BGN 
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20-22 billion (10-11 billion euros). !e Borisov government had stressed that Bulgaria 
and Bulgarians simply could not a+ord such cost – for comparison, the construction of 
So$a’s subway had cost only BGN 1 billion
!e reaction to this decision of the Borisov government among the political parties 
was mixed. Bulgaria’s socialists slammed the abandonment of the Belene project. 
Bulgaria’s far-right party Ataka also expressed its disappointment over the government’s 
decision to quit the construction of the Belene NPP and called it a “betrayal of Bulgaria’s 
national interest.” Bulgaria’s right-wing parties Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB) 
and the Union of Democratic Forces were in favor of the abandonment of the project. 
At the end of March 2012, the Bulgarian parliament sealed the end of the Belene 
project by adopting a decision to terminate the construction of the plant. A total of 120 
members of parliament (MPs) voted in favor of the termination of the Belene NPP, 42 
voted against, and one MP abstained. A total of 163 out of 240 MPs were present at the 
voting. 
Following the decision of the Borisov government to terminate the Belene project, 
in September 2012, ASE increased its legal claim against Bulgaria’s National Electric 
Company, NEK, from Euro 58 million to EUR 1 billion.
!e Bulgarian Socialist Party declared that it would demand a no-con$dence 
vote in Parliament against the Borisov government, and a referendum on the Belene 
NPP. On April 5, 2012, the Bulgarian Socialist Party and far-right Ataka submi=ed a 
no-con$dence motion in the Parliament. !e move had been triggered by what the 
two parties perceived as a failure of Borisov’s ruling centrist-right GERB party. !e 
no-con$dence vote had been doomed, however, as all other political formations had 
declared that they would not support it.
Too many interests and stakeholders were involved in the Belene NPP project to let it 
quietly die. In the summer of 2012, the Socialists pushed for a nuclear-plant referendum. 
By the end of July the party had been able to gather 770,000 signatures in support of the 
referendum and used them to table a referendum petition to the Bulgarian Parliament 
on July 30, 2012. According to the regulations, 500,000 signatures were needed to call a 
referendum in support of the Belene NPP project. An inspection of the Socialist Party’s 
petition for a referendum on the fate of the Belene plant had been accomplished in 
early October 2012 and, with 543 639 valid signatures, the national referendum vote 
had become irreversible. At the end of October, Bulgarian President Rosen Plevneliev 
scheduled the country’s nuclear power plant referendum for January 27, 2013.
!e referendum was in favor of the construction of a new nuclear power plant in 
Bulgaria. !us 61 percent of the voters said “Yes” to it, while 39 percent cast a “No” 
ballot. Voter turnout had been very low, however, slightly exceeding 20 percent. Under 
the law, the referendum results obliged the Parliament to put back the Belene NPP 
project on the parliament’s agenda. Amid street protests and the resignation of the 
Borisov government in February 2013, the GERB-dominated parliament voted again 
for the abandonment of the Belene NPP project.
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4.8. Post Scriptum
!e construction of the Belene NPP was one of the election promises of the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party in 2013. However, the Oresharski coalition government of the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party and the Turkish Minority Party which came to power in May 2013 
decided to launch a project for the expansion of the existing Kozloduy nuclear power 
plant instead. It signed an agreement with the U.S. utility company Westinghouse 
Electric for the construction of an AP1000 unit (Unit Seven) of the Kozloduy NPP. 
Westinghouse Electric Company is the world’s pioneering nuclear energy company and 
is a leading supplier of nuclear plant products and technologies to utilities throughout 
the world. Today, Westinghouse technology is the basis for approximately one-half of 
the world’s operating nuclear plants, including more than 50 percent of those in Europe. 
Nonetheless, speculations about the revival of the Belene NPP project have frequently 
arisen.
5. Discussion and Conclusions: Determinants of Sovereign Investment 
Protectionism in Bulgaria
With Russia as a potential strategic sovereign investor in the Belene NPP project, the 
protectionist knot against the Russian investment has centered around two bo=om-
line questions: Does Bulgaria really need the plant; and, if it does, What price can the 
poorest member of the EU a+ord to pay for it? While these questions might not seem so 
di"cult to answer from the perspective of a pure business logic, Belene has been an on-
o+ project for years, with no clear vision on both questions, as Kondov (2011) asserts. 
!e key variable that complicates the answers to these two questions is the national 
identity of the strategic investor – Russian versus Western (European or American). 
!at is, leave a space between the dash mark and the word “Russian”; and eliminate the 
question mark a#er the word “American”. Seemingly, the answers to these questions 
would di+er, depending on whether a Russian or a western investor were involved in 
the project. Debates over the necessity and cost of the project (economic arguments) 
were intertwined with the deeper political-ideological divides and shadows of the past. 
!e Bulgarian Socialist Party, a successor to the Bulgarian Communist Party and 
Russia-friendly, thus became the key supporter of the Belene NPP project with Russian 
sovereign involvement. It was able to mobilize public support in favor of the project to 
the extent that the country had to organize a national referendum on nuclear energy, 
the $rst in the country’s post-communist history. !e socialists argued that the planned 
two reactors of 1,000 MW each at Belene would help Bulgaria restore its dominant 
position in the Balkans as an energy exporter, which the country lost with the closure 
of the four Soviet-made reactors at its Kozloduy NPP prior to its accession to the EU in 
2007. Supporters of the project further argued that Bulgaria would have to pay around 
€1billion in compensation to Russia if it walks out of the project.
!e center-right, generally anti-communist political and Russophobe parties in the 
country, such as GERB, turned into the key opponents of the Belene project with Russian 
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participation. Initially their protectionist discourse had focused not on rejection of the 
Belene project per se but on energy diversi$cation and bringing a strategic investor from 
the West (EU or U.S.) into the Belene project. !ey argued that Rosatom’ involvement 
in the project would deepen Bulgaria’s energy dependence on Russia even further, and 
also voiced concerns about the safety of Russian-made nuclear reactors. Later on, with 
the withdrawal of Germany’s RWE from the project and the impossibility to a=ract 
another investor from the West, these parties employed economic argumentation 
against the Belene project with Russian involvement. !ey thus argued that there was 
no $rm evidence that demand for Bulgarian-generated electricity in Southeast Europe 
would rise in the foreseeable future, and that the cost of the electricity from Belene 
remained unclear.
Overall, because of Bulgaria’s high energy dependence on Russia, most of the 
questions raised against Russia’s sovereign involvement in the Belene NPP project 
concerned the issue of national security and energy security in particular. !e gas crisis 
in January 2009, when Gazprom cut o+ gas supplies to Europe for almost a month, had 
hit hard Bulgaria and had fueled a new look at Russia’s high command over Bulgaria’s 
energy sector. !e accident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant in 2011 and the 
new EU nuclear safety requirements for building and operating nuclear power plants 
made it increasingly clear to the Bulgarian political elite that the Belene NPP project is 
becoming economically unviable. In the end, the fate of the Belene nuclear power plant 
project was decided on pure economic grounds.
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Appendix 2. Rosatom’s International Nuclear Power Plant Projects














































Bangladesh Ruppur-1/2 VVER-1000 Under construction
Hungary Paks-5/6 VVER-1200
Deal signed. Construction to begin 
in 2018
Egypt El_Dabaa-1/2 VVER-1200 Deal signed
Argentina 6 NPPs VVER-1200 Deal signed
Slovakia Mochovce-3/4 VVER-440 Under negotiation
Ukraine Khmelnitskiy-3/4 VVER-1000/392B Under negotiation
South Africa 8 nuclear reactors VVER-1200 Under negotiation
Nigeria 2 NPPs VVER-1200 Under negotiation
Jordan Unit-1/2 VVER-1000 Planned
Finland Hanhikivi-1 VVER-1200 Planned
Sources: Rosatom Concern’s website; Wikipedia
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Appendix 3. !e Belene Nuclear Power Plant Project: Key Data
Location Town of Belene, at the bank of the Danube River






Reactor Model PWR WWER 1000/V466
Output Capacity 2,000 MW (two units of 1,000 MW each)
Design Life 60 years
Estimated Investment Euro 10 billion
EPC Contractor (engineering, 
procurement and commissioning of 
the plant)
AtomStroyExport (ASE), Russia, a subsidiary of 
Rosatom (2006 – onwards)
Foreign Investor with Equity Stake
(to operate the plant)
(1) RWE, Germany (December 2008 – October 2009);
(2) Rosatom, Russia (2010 – March 2012)
Project Cancelled March 2012
National Referendum on the fate of 
the Belene NPP
January 27, 2013. Con$rms project cancellation
Transition to Kozloduy NPP
(Reactor Seven)
2014-2015
Westinghouse Electric, USA, selected with unclear 
(EPC or Equity Contractor) status
